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GROUP SIZE, HETEROGENEITY, AND
PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR: DESIGNING LEGAL
STRUCTURES TO FACILITATE COOPERATION
IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY
D. Benjamin Barros*
The social benefits that large and diverse groups may provide to
their communities are well recognized andfundamental to modern American law in many respects. However, recent empirical research indicates
that the largerand more diverse a group is, the less likely it is that the
group's members will cooperate to achieve those benefits. This Essay
addresses the need for legal structures that mitigate the adverse effects
of diversity and growth in size while encouragingprosocialbehavior that
brings about benefits to the community. Beyond just promoting diversity
and its benefits, this Essay argues that the law needs to go further in
some instances to ensure that the benefits of diversity are actually
realized.
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INTRODUCTION

A recent empirical study by the political scientist Robert Putnam
revealed that increased diversity within a community corresponds
strongly with social isolation and alienation among that community's
members.' These findings are consistent with other recent empirical research showing that increases in both diversity (heterogeneity in social
science speak) and group size often have a negative impact on coopera2
tion and other prosocial behavior.
One easy conclusion to draw from these findings is that it is best to
organize people into small, homogeneous groups. Another is that government policies that interfere with people's apparent preferences for
these types of groups do more harm than good. For example, discussing
Putnam's study in a column titled GreaterDiversity Equals More Misery, one commentator took a shot at "central planners" who encourage
diversity through "[m]ass immigration" instead of respecting people's
"age-old peaceful preferences" to maintain homogeneous communities. 3
The impact of group size and diversity on prosocial behavior, however, is too complicated to lend itself to simple solutions. Leaving aside
the significant normative issues raised by diversity, organizing people
into small, homogeneous groups has at least two practical problems.
First, increases in group size and diversity can have beneficial effects
that should not be discounted.4 As a result, the overall impact of heterogeneity and group size on cooperative behavior can be extremely complicated.5 It is far more difficult to generalize about the preferability of
large, diverse groups over small, homogeneous ones than a superficial
reading of the social science literature might suggest. Second, diversity
is a well-established fact of contemporary life that is likely to increase
1 Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first
Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 149 (2007). Although it does not clearly pinpoint
diversity as the culprit, another recent study found a marked decrease in close friendships in
American society. See Miller McPherson et al., Social Isolation in America: Changes in Core
Discussion Networks over Two Decades, 71 Am. Soc. REV. 353, passim (2006). Between
1985 and 2004, the number of Americans who said that they have no one to talk to about
important issues more than doubled, from 10 to 25 percent. See id. at 358 tbl.1, 359 tbl.2.
2 See infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.

3 Ilana Mercer, Op-Ed., GreaterDiversity Equals More Misery, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
July 22, 2007, http://www.ocregister.com/opinion/putnam-diversity-social-1781099-racialgreater.
4 Putnam, supra note 1, at 140-41 (summarizing studies about the positive impact of
diversity); see also infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (discussing the positive impacts
of group size). One recent example, cited by Putnam, is ScoTr E. PAGE, THE DI RENCE:
How THE POWER OF DwERsrry CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMs, SCHOOLS AND SOCIETIES
(2007). See Putnam, supra note 1, at 140.
5 See discussion infra Part I.A.
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over time, 6 and many interactions in modem societies inevitably take
place on a large scale. Rather than debate the abstract merits of homogeneity or pine away for an idealized recollection of small-town life, it
seems more productive to examine how diversity and group size impact
cooperation and learn how to mitigate negative effects while taking advantage of positive ones.
This Essay focuses on a subset of the larger enterprise of addressing
group size and diversity in society. It discusses recent social science
research that explains how and why group size and heterogeneity affect
prosocial behavior. It then considers how to take the results of this research into account in the design of legal structures. These structures,
created by both government and private actors, often shape human interaction. Consider a few examples. Property rules, whether publicly or
privately imposed, can influence how and when neighbors interact with
each other and how resources are managed within a community. Public
corporate law and private corporate charters and by-laws define the context in which members of a corporate board work with each other to
fulfill their duties. Lending groups organized by private microfinance
banks create mutual dependencies between borrowers.
In many of these scenarios, legal structures can be designed to encourage cooperation, either by placing people into contexts where cooperation naturally thrives or by consciously addressing the factors that
cause group size and diversity to undercut cooperation. The problem
addressed here is not a new one. In Politics, Aristotle described with
admiration the sharing of property among friends and observed, "IT]he
special business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent disposition. ' '7 As one study of the social psychology of helping behaviors
observed, this "benevolent disposition" has more to do with social structure than anything else: "Rather than seeing prosocial behavior as something that is determined either by personality or by the situation, one may
conceptualize everyday helping more accurately as originating in the social relationship." 8 The "special business" of designers of legal structures, whether legislators or private actors, therefore should be to place
people in contexts that maximize the possibility of prosocial behavior or
take affirmative steps to minimize the factors that tend to undercut it.
This Essay looks at the impact of group size and heterogeneity on
prosocial behavior in two contexts. Part I focuses on cooperation in the
6 See Putnam, supra note 1, at 138. This trend towards increasing diversity is reflected
in recent census data. See Sam Roberts, Minorities Now Form Majority in One-Third of Most
Populous Counties, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 2007, at A14.
7 Aristotle, PoLMcs, Bk. H (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1943), available at http://classics.
mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.2.two.html.
8 Paul R. Amato, Personalityand Social Network Involvement as Predictorsof Helping
Behavior in Everyday Life, 53 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 31, 41 (1990).
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provision of public goods. The impact of increased group size and heterogeneity on cooperation tends to be consistently negative in this context. 9

The characteristics of some types of goods, however, are such that they
are more likely to be provided in large or diverse groups. 10 The net impact of increases in group size and heterogeneity on the provision of
public goods therefore depends on the type of good being provided."
The social science literature in this area also explains how increases in
group size and heterogeneity impair cooperative behavior by, among
other things, making informal enforcement of group norms more difficult. 12 Designers of legal structures can address this problem by formal-

izing norms and using dispute resolution mechanisms as a means of
enforcement.
Part II examines how people interact on smaller scales to help
others. For everyday helping behavior, the impact of group size and heterogeneity largely mirrors the results for the provision of public goods.
People are more likely to engage in helping behavior within social net13
works where informal norms of reciprocity are easier to enforce.
Grameen Bank, a microlender that recently won the Nobel Peace Prize,
takes this into account by organizing small, homogeneous groups of borrowers who are interdependent upon each other.' 4 In another small-scale
context, involving helping behavior in emergencies, the impact of group
size is striking: a person in need of assistance in an emergency is actually
5
less likely to receive help from a large group than from a small group.'
The psychological explanation for why the presence of others inhibits
action by an individual could apply to other scenarios where it is desirable for a person to take action in ambiguous circumstances. In the context of corporate boards, for example, the negative impact of group size
on helping behavior suggests that directors will be more likely to take
9 MANCUR OLSON, LocnC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 48 (1965) (explaining that larger
groups are less likely to cooperate and further their own interests).
10 See Pamela E. Oliver & Gerald Marwell, The Paradox of Group Size in Collective
Action: A Theory of the CriticalMass. 11, 53 AM. Soc. REv. 1, 3 (1988).
11 See id.
12 See, e.g., Oriana Bandiera et al., Cooperation in Collective Action, 13 ECONOMICS OF
TRANSITON 473, 478 (2005) ("[S]ocial heterogeneity might undermine the ability to devise

mechanisms that sustain cooperation. For instance, if social sanctions are effective within but
not across different groups, heterogeneous communities are less likely to be able to use sanctions as an enforcement mechanism.").
13 Amato, supra note 8.
14 See Grameen Bank, Credit Delivery System, http://www.grameen-info.org (follow
"Methodology" tab; then follow "Credit Delivery System" hyperlink) (explaining Gamgreen's

system for lending and how it groups borrowers in homogeneous groups of five).
15 See John M. Darley & Bibb Latan6, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion
of Responsibility, 8 J. OF PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 377 (1968); see also Martin Gansberg, Thirty-Eight Who Saw Murder Didn't Call the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1964, at 1,

available at http://www2.selu.edu/Academics/Faculty/scraig/gansberg.html.
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action against corporate malfeasance when the size of the board is small
and where supervisory responsibility is clearly assigned to individual
16
board members.
I.

LARGE-SCALE INTERACTION: COOPERATION IN THE PROVISION

OF PUBLIC GOODS

The impact of group size and heterogeneity on cooperative behavior
in the large-scale provision of public goods is complex. Theoretical
models of collective action reflect this complexity, with the predicted
impact of increases in group size and heterogeneity on the provision of
public goods depending in significant part on the nature of the good being provided. Another significant factor impacting the provision of public goods is the increase in transaction costs that can accompany
increases in group size and heterogeneity.
Empirical research reveals outcomes consistent with the theoretical
models. Studies of cooperation in the provision of public goods reveal
ambiguous results on the impact of group size, reflecting in part the different ways group size can impact cooperation for different types of
goods. The studies are less ambiguous on the impact of group heterogeneity, which typically inhibits cooperation by increasing the transactions
costs associated with negotiating and policing the agreements or norms
necessary to facilitate cooperation.
This section examines the theory and the empirical evidence in turn.
It then discusses ways to design legal structures to either promote cooperation or mitigate the negative effects that increases in group size and
heterogeneity have on cooperative behavior.
A.

The Theory: Collective Action and the Provision of Public Goods

According to theoretical models of collective action, the impact of
group size and heterogeneity on the provision of a public good depends
on the specific nature of the good to be provided. 17 The most important
characteristic in this context is a good's jointness of supply-that is, the
degree to which the good costs the same to produce regardless of the
number of people who consume it.18 A radio broadcast has very high
jointness of supply because the costs of production have very little, if
any, relation to the number of people who listen to the broadcast. In
contrast, manufactured products typically have low jointness of supply
because the cost of production increases with the number of consumers.
16 See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
17 Oliver & Marwell, supra note 10, at 2-4.
18 Id.
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Economies of scale, however, may make the increase in cost less than
directly proportional to the increase in consumers.
Mancur Olson famously conjectured in Logic of Collective Action
that provision of public goods would be more likely in small groups than
in large groups. 19 Research has shown, however, that this is true only
where goods have low jointness of supply. 20 Goods with low jointness
of supply, however, also tend to be highly excludable, meaning that it is
possible to prevent others from consuming the good. 2 1 Collective action
problems are reduced when a good is excludable. 22 An individual willing to provide the good can secure the benefits of the good, and if a
group cooperates in pooling resources to provide the good, then the
group can exclude people who do not cooperate (i.e., free riders) from
consuming the good. Because exclusion can be done on a group level
even if the good is held in common within the group, this model is relevant to goods that are most efficiently provided by a group, such as community infrastructure projects.
At the opposite extreme, goods that cost the same regardless of the
number of consumers, and therefore have pure jointness of supply, are
more likely to be provided in large groups because large groups are more
likely to have a critical mass of people willing to provide the good.2 3 An
individual or group of individuals who value the good will be willing to
provide it if the benefits of provision outweigh the costs.2 4 Because
there is no increased cost in providing the good to the entire community,
there is no reason to exclude others.25 In fact, where there is pure joint19

OLSON,

supra note 9, at 33-36.

20 Oliver & Marwell, supra note 10, at 3. Oliver and Marwell illustrate the impact of

jointness of supply on the provision of public goods with the example of an academic department that shares computer terminals and encourages members to use portions of their research
grant money to buy terminals for the department. See id. at 3-4. A necessary, if unrealistic,
assumption for the example to work is that because of technological constraints, members of
the department cannot be excluded from using any of the terminals, although outsiders can be
excluded. See id. Assuming a need to provide computer access to fifty percent of the department at any given time, then five terminals are needed for a ten-person department, and fifty
terminals are needed for a one hundred-person department. Id. If an individual purchases a
computer for the department, then that person's benefit from the added terminal is one-tenth of
a terminal in a ten-person department but is one one-hundredth of a terminal in a one hundredperson department. Id. If a new terminal costs $500, then in the ten-person department the
individual would have to value access to a terminal at $5,000 for it to be worth spending the
money for a one-tenth-of-a-terminal increase in access. Id. Even worse, the individual would
have to value access at $50,000 for it to be worth spending the money in a one hundred-person
department. Id. It therefore is more likely that the individual will be willing to purchase the
terminal in a ten-person department than in a one hundred-person department. See id.
21 See id.
22 See ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RuLEs, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL REsOURCEs, 6-8
(defining exclusion and discussing the difficulty of excluding common-pool resources).
23 See Oliver & Marwell, supra note 10, at 3-4.
24 See id.
25 See id.
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ness of supply, there is often no way to exclude others. 2 6 An example is
a non-commercial radio broadcast that will be of special interest to a
specific group of listeners-perhaps members of a religious or cultural
group. The good (the broadcast) will be provided if the interested individuals are willing to bear the cost, and the broadcast will be available to
anyone who wants to listen. The larger the overall group, the more likely
that a subset of the group will be willing to unilaterally supply the good.
Similarly, the more heterogeneous the group (heterogeneity in this theoretical context being measured by diversity of preferences), the more
likely an individual or small subset of the group will be willing to act
unilaterally. 27 It is important, however, to clarify that in this circumstance, the prosocial behavior (i.e., providing the public good) is
achieved by unilateral action, rather than by cooperation. If the cost of
the good is so high that the costs exceed the benefits for any subset of the
larger group, serious collective action problems arise and the good may
28
not be provided.
In between the extremes are goods with intermediate jointness of
supply, where economies of scale reduce, but do not eliminate, the marginal cost of providing the good to additional consumers. 29 The impact
of group size on the provision of this type of good is complex and depends on three factors. The first is the cost function of the good, which
measures the degree to which the cost changes as the number of consumers increases. 30 If the cost function is such that the price per consumer
reduces greatly with the number of consumers (i.e., if the good has high
economies of scale), then the provision of the good will be more likely as
the size of the group increases. The second is the distribution of the
willingness to bear the cost within the group. 3 1 If the willingness to bear
the cost is heterogeneous within the group, and this heterogeneity increases the likelihood that some members of the group will be willing to
bear relatively large portions of the cost, then the likelihood of provision
will increase. 32 The third is transaction costs. 33 As a group becomes
larger, organizational and other transaction costs increase, making cooperation in the provision of the good less likely. Transaction costs can
also increase with group heterogeneity. Diversity of preferences can
make agreement difficult, increasing negotiation costs. Diversity of
other sorts-for example, of ethnicity, religion, or social class-can also
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id. at 4.
id.
id.
id.

33 See id.
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impede the formation of a social consensus, thereby increasing transac34
tion CoStS.
Therefore, the impact of group size and heterogeneity on the cooperative provision of goods with intermediate jointness of supply depends
on the interrelationship of these factors. The outcome of this interrelationship, of course, will be situation-specific. For goods with high economies of scale, and therefore relatively high jointness of supply,
increases in group size can increase the likelihood of cooperative provision of the good. Increases in heterogeneity can also increase the likelihood of provision if some segments of the group are willing to bear a
large share of the cost of providing the good. These potentially beneficial impacts will be counteracted by any corresponding increase in transaction costs caused by increases in group size and heterogeneity.
B.

Empirical Research on Cooperation in Collective Action

The results of recent empirical studies on cooperation in the provision of public goods have been consistent with the model of collective
action discussed in the prior section. The impact of group size varied
depending on the context of the study. Group heterogeneity, most often
reflected in differences in ethnicity, social class, or religion, had a consistently negative impact on cooperation. There are several plausible explanations for the negative impact of group heterogeneity, each of which
is consistent with the view that group heterogeneity can increase transaction costs and therefore inhibit cooperation.
Many empirical studies have examined cooperation in the context of
public good provision in developing countries. In this context, the impact of group size was ambiguous, perhaps reflecting the economies of
scale possible with the types of public goods at issue. 35 The impact of
heterogeneity, however, was consistently negative. A study in rural Kenya found that ethnic diversity negatively impacted the provision of
school funding and water well maintenance. 36 In a study of irrigation
systems in Mexico, social heterogeneity, measured by the number of villages from which members of an irrigation system were drawn, "ha[d] a
34 See e.g., Pranab Bardhan, Irrigation and Cooperation:An EmpiricalAnalysis of 48
Irrigation Communities in South India, 48 ECON. DEV. & CuLTURAL CHANGE 847 (2000);
Asim Ijaz Khwaja, Can Good Projects Succeed in Bad Communities? Collective Action in the
Himalayas (John F. Kennedy Sch. Of Gov't, Harvard University, Working Paper No. RWPO1043, 2001), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=295571.
35 Oriana Bandiera et al., Cooperation in Collective Action, 13 ECON. OF TRANSITION
473, 481-82 (2005); Bardhan, supra note 34, at 861; Jeff Dayton-Johnson, Determinants of
Collective Action on the Local Commons: A Model With Evidence from Mexico, 62 J. DEV.
ECON. 181, 182 (2000).
36 Mary Kay Gugerty & Edward Miguel, Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public
Goods in Kenya, 89 J. PuB. EcON. 2325 (2005).
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consistently negative impact on group performance. ' 37 Other studies of
38
cooperation in the context of community irrigation systems in Pakistan
and India 39 also showed the negative impact of heterogeneity on
cooperation.
Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul suggest four theoretical explanations
for the negative impact of heterogeneity on cooperation in these contexts:
(1) "socially homogeneous communities might be better at solving collective action problems because all members have similar tastes, whereas
heterogeneous communities find it hard to agree on the characteristics of
the common good," (2) "individuals might simply dislike working with
others outside their group, thus making cooperation less likely in heterogeneous communities," (3) "the different groups in heterogeneous communities might disagree on how to share the private benefits associated
with collective action, or value less the benefits accruing to members of
the other groups," and (4) "social heterogeneity might undermine the
ability to devise mechanisms that sustain cooperation.'"'4 Another contributing explanation could be the reduced participation in social activithat are
ties that Putnam and others have found in 4localities
1
heterogeneous.
ethnically
or
racially,
economically,
As will be discussed further in the next section, it is critical to take
the fourth explanation into account when designing legal structures, because legal structures can replace or strengthen the informal cooperative
mechanisms that are undercut by increases in heterogeneity. Both theoretical and empirical research suggests that cooperation is increased
through credible punishments for non-cooperators. Bandiera, Barankay,
and Rasul observe that "successful communities usually exhibit well-defined rules, the ability to monitor .. .and to punish deviators, . . . a
42
mechanism for conflict resolution and ... a forum for discussions.

An instructive example of how heterogeneity can undercut these mechanisms of cooperation comes from the Kenya study, which showed that
social sanctions play an important role in sustaining public goods provision by a group and that ethnic diversity undercuts those social sanctions. 43 For example, "[s]chool committees in ethnically diverse areas
threaten fewer sanctions and use less verbal pressure against parents who
37 Dayton-Johnson, supra note 35, at 182.
38 Khwaja, supra note 34.
39 Bardhan, supra note 34, at 847.
40 Bandiera et al., supra note 35, at 478-79; see also Juan-Camilo Cardenas, Real Wealth
and Experimental Cooperations:Experiments in the Field Lab, 70 J.DEV. EcON. 263 (2003).
41 Putnam, supra note 1, at 149; see also Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, Participation in Heterogeneous Communities, 115 Q.J. EcON. 847 (2000).

42 Bandiera et al., supra note 35, at 474-75.
43 Gugerty & Miguel, supra note 36, at 2327.
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do not contribute at public fundraisings, pay school fees, or contribute in
other ways to the school." 44
Although the impact of group size generally is ambiguous in the
context of providing community infrastructure, it does have a clear impact on cooperation in different experimental settings involving other
types of public goods. As with the findings on increases in heterogeneity, the impact of group size on the ability to enforce informal norms
plays an important role in the provision of public goods. Bandiera,
Barankay, and Rasul performed a field study using data on daily productivity from farm workers picking fruit. 45 The motivation to cooperate
came from a relative incentive scheme, where workers were paid based
on their performance relative to the other workers-that is, workers who
picked more fruit than the group average were paid at a higher rate.4 6 In
this structure, the optimal outcome for the group of workers as a whole
was to cooperate and expend a minimum amount of effort. 47 Each individual worker, however, had an incentive to defect and pick more fruit
48
than the average.
In the experiment, workers were placed in groups with different
characteristics on different days. 4 9 The relative incentive scheme was
replaced halfway through the picking season with a flat piece rate in
which there was no incentive to cooperate.50 The results showed that the
workers were more productive using the piece rate, indicating some de51
gree of cooperation by the group under the relative incentive scheme.
In this setting, increasing group size under the relative incentive
scheme had a significant negative impact on cooperation, demonstrated
by an increase in worker productivity.5 2 The negative impact of increasing group size began to level off, however, as the groups reached a size
of around 30 to 45 workers. 53 Group size had no impact on productivity
54
when piece rate compensation was used.
This study tested three dimensions of heterogeneity, all of which
negatively impacted cooperation. First, cooperation decreased as the
percentage of workers of the same nationality decreased, suggesting that
it is easier to enforce cooperation among people of the same national44 Id.
45 Bandiera et al., supra note 35, at 488-94.
46 Id. at 482-84.
47

Id.

48 Id.
49 Id.

50
51
52
53
54

at 485-88.

Id. at 483.
Id. at 488-94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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ity. 55 Second, cooperation decreased as diversity of ability increased,
reflecting the strongest workers' lack of incentive to cooperate. 56 Third,
cooperation decreased as the diversity of stakes for being fired increased.5 7 For this latter metric, the study took advantage of the fact that
some workers, who were working as part of a university internship program, would lose more than other workers if they were fired for shirking. 58 The interns had less of an incentive to cooperate than other

workers, and as the percentage of interns increased, productivity increased. 59 The last two results, on diversity of skills and stakes, show
that the presence of people with low individual incentives to cooperate
60
reduces overall cooperation.
Regarding the impact of heterogeneity as measured by nationality,
this study is consistent with others showing that cooperation in the provision of community infrastructure goods decreases with ethnic, class, and
religious diversity. These findings collectively suggest that increased diversity of this type makes enforcement of cooperative norms more difficult. In terms of the impact of group size, the difference between the
results for the infrastructure studies and the field study is likely attributable to the different characteristics of the goods at issue. Goods like an
irrigation system feature some economies of scale, which can counteract
the negative impact of group size on cooperation. The good at issue in
the field study, in contrast, was simply cooperative behavior. This behavior has pure jointness of supply-the cost of producing cooperative
behavior is the same regardless of how many people benefit. The benefit
that accompanies this behavior, however, changes significantly depending on whether other members of the group also cooperate. In this circumstance, no subgroup would be willing (or able) to unilaterally
provide the good. Absent economies of scale, increased group size affects cooperative behavior negatively.
C. Cooperative Behavior and the Design of Legal Structures
The theoretical models and empirical studies described in the prior
sections suggest that increases in group size and heterogeneity reduce
cooperative behavior, that these negative effects are sometimes overcome by the advantages of economies of scale possible in the provision
of some types of goods, and that the reductions in cooperative behavior
are caused at least in part by the inhibition of informal mechanisms used
55 Id. at 489-91.
56 Id. at 491-93.

57 Id. at 493-94.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 491-94.
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to enforce cooperative norms. These results in turn suggest two approaches that designers of legal structures can take to encourage cooperation. First, legal structures can be designed to place people into contexts
in which they are likely to cooperate. Second, legal structures can be
designed to account for the inhibitions on cooperation caused by increases in group size and diversity either by using dispute resolution
mechanisms to strengthen informal norms or by replacing informal
norms with formal ones. This section illustrates the potential of these
approaches through two examples from property law: (1) the organization of residential communities, and (2) the ownership of natural
resources.
1. Structuring Residential Communities
Public and private legal structures shape the organization of residential communities. For example, subdivision and zoning regulations place
public law constraints on the size of developments. Common interest
communities provide private governance structures-homeowners', cooperative, or condominium associations-that control many aspects of
the organization of residential communities. Resident councils can play
a significant role in public housing.
The authors of the field worker study mentioned above noted that
"the finding that smaller groups cooperate more would justify .. .the
organization of larger communities into smaller subgroups that interact
with each other through representatives." 6 1 One method of doing so
would be to design residential communities to facilitate interaction between people on a smaller scale. Subdivision and zoning regulations
could be used to limit the size of residential communities, though such
regulations would be relatively blunt instruments to use in this context.
Perhaps more promisingly, private law common interest communities
could be structured to allow people to interact in smaller groups.
It is important to recall, however, that smaller is not always better in
this context. Some goods are better produced in large groups. Take, for
example, the design of a suburban residential community that will have
around 400 homes. Some public goods with economies of scale, like a
communal pool, would best be provided by the entire community. On
the other hand, fostering more generic community cooperation may work
better on smaller scales. The best approach, therefore, may be to have an
overall organization that handles the provision of certain goods for the
entire community, while dividing the community into smaller groups for
other purposes. This structure could be conceived as a confederation of
smaller groups that on most matters decide issues for themselves, but
61

Id. at 495.

2008]

GROUP SIZE, HETEROGENEITY, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR

215

agree to cooperate on larger scales when circumstances make it beneficial to do so. Privately created residential structures of this type are already starting to emerge. As Robert H. Nelson recently observed, "The
private community of Reston, Virginia has almost 60,000 residents who
live in more than 130 neighborhood 'clusters,' ranging in size from 11 to
231 housing units, and each with its own neighborhood governing association. At a higher level, one overarching Restonwide association pri'62
vately oversees all this."
The design of common interest community organizations, resident
councils, and other private law structures can also play a role in mitigating the negative impacts of group size and heterogeneity by strengthening or replacing the informal mechanisms that facilitate cooperative
behavior in small, homogenous groups. In diverse settings, these informal shaming mechanisms could be replaced by formal dispute resolution
mechanisms that address problems of non-cooperation. The goal here is
not to avoid conflict, but to encourage members of the group to raise
disputes over cooperation and to facilitate the effective resolution of
those disputes.
The Kenya study discussed in the prior section examined the negative impact that heterogeneity has on cooperation and found that school
committees in diverse districts were less likely to use informal sanctions
such as verbal pressure than those in homogeneous districts. 63 The problem identified by the Kenya study was not that informal sanctions were
less effective in diverse groups, but rather that the informal sanctions
were used less often. The hesitancy to use this type of informal shaming
mechanism in diverse groups could have various sources, such as fear of
offending a member of another group or fear of criticizing members of
one's own group in front of members of another group. Formalized dispute resolution mechanisms could enable group leaders to confront noncooperators while making confrontation as respectful and effective as
possible.
The Kenya study also highlights the risks of relying on informal
cooperative norms for the provision of goods like school funding in large
and diverse groups. For the provision of some goods in some groups,
using formal dispute resolution mechanisms to enforce cooperation may
work. For other goods in other groups, informal norms may need to be
replaced by formalized rules. Taking examples from the Kenya study,
62 Robert H. Nelson, Community Associations in Tiebout and Non-Tiebout Worlds:
Double Taxation and Other Complications 12 (Sept. 2, 2007) (paper presented at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association, Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p-mlaapa_researchcitation/2/1/0/1/3/pages2 1 0 l 3 5 /p 2 10
135-1.php.
63 See Gugerty & Miguel, supra note 36.
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voluntary school funding could be replaced by a sliding tuition schedule
that takes ability to pay into account, and formal limits could be set for
the use of a shared resource like an irrigation system. 64 In the context of
organizing residential communities, express rules could be established
for the use of common areas in a residential community, and fees could
be set for the maintenance of common facilities. Whether a formal or
informal approach is preferable will depend on the particular context, but
it is a safe presumption that as group size and heterogeneity increase, so
does the utility of formality.
2.

Management of Natural Resources

Management of natural resources provides another illustration of
both the uses and the limits of relying on informal cooperative norms. In
this context, the public good being provided is restraint from overconsumption. In terms of structures of ownership, the question is typically
presented as whether a common property system will inevitably lead to a
tragedy of the commons. The debate is most relevant to common-pool
resources, which are amenable to exclusion of non-group members even
if they are held in common by the group. 65 In a common-pool scenario,
the potential for a tragedy of the commons is limited to overconsumption
by members of the group. Examples include pastureland held in common by members of a village and the common irrigation systems mentioned in previous sections. Outsiders are excluded, and
overconsumption can be avoided if the members of the village are able to
cooperate.
In a tragedy of the commons scenario, the optimal outcome is for all
people to cooperate and consume the common resource at a sustainable
rate. 66 The lack of mechanisms to enforce cooperation, however, makes
overconsumption an option for each member of the group, because an
individual member gains nothing from refraining while others consume
as much as they can. 6 7 In economic terms, the tragedy of the commons

results from both positive and negative externalities-the benefits of cooperation are external to the actor, as are the harms of overconsumption. 68 One solution to the tragedy of the commons is to divide common
property into private property, because private property internalizes both
the positive and negative externalities associated with the commons-if
property owners consume at a sustainable rate, forbearance inures to
64 See id.
65 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
66 See OSTROM Er AL., supra note 22, at 4-6.
67 Id.
68 Id.
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Private property solutions, however, are not the only way to avoid
the tragedy of the commons for common-pool resources. A large body
of literature has developed that explains how common management can
work in some circumstances, and the theory is backed up by empirical
69
research that shows how common management can work in practice.
Consistent with the research on group size and prosocial behavior discussed above, the literature suggests that common-pool resources will
work for relatively small-scale resources controlled by small groups of
people, but might not work for larger-scale problems. 70 The circumstances of cooperation "can be predicted from transaction cost analysis.
Critically important are opportunities for mutual monitoring and social
leverage; small group size helps to produce these opportunities, as do
'7
preexisting familial and social relations." '
Even though relying on cooperative behavior can be problematic in
large or diverse groups, it may be helpful in addressing certain largescale problems. As Carol Rose observes, "global commons problems
have many components that are much more localized. Global warming
from carbon dioxide may be a planet-wide environmental issue, yet forests that sequester carbon can be highly localized. ' 72 A recent empirical
study of a community forestry system developed in Nepal provides an
example. In 1993, the government of Nepal began transferring
forestland from national government ownership to local community ownership. 73 The result was a significant reduction in resource consumption-that is, communal ownership led to less deforestation than when
74
the forests were owned by the public.
Success in collectively managing common-pool resources is most
likely to be achieved by small or homogeneous groups, because they are
more likely to be able to enforce collective norms on resource consumption' As discussed above in the context of residential communities, the
negative impacts of group size and heterogeneity may be mitigated to a
certain extent through organizational structure and dispute resolution
mechanisms. In many resource scenarios, however, it may be that other
ownership structures need to be used. Common ownership structures
69 See generally id.
70 Carol M. Rose, Expanding the Choicesfor the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-FashionedCommon Property Regimes, 10 Du"E
ENvmL. L. & POL'Y F. 45, 49-50 (1999).
71 Id. at 49.
72 Id. at 50.

73 Eric V. Edmonds, Government-InitiatedCommunity Resource Management and Local
Resource Extractionfrom Nepal's Forests, 68 J. DEV. ECON. 89, 90 (2002).
74 Id. at 112-14.
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that work for some resources in small, homogeneous communities-such
as common ownership of pastureland in a small village or common management of forests in Nepal-are likely to fail if the characteristics of the
good or group make reliance on informal cooperation impractical or
undesirable.
II.

SMALL-SCALE INTERACTION: HELPING BEHAVIOR
AND RESPONSES TO EMERGENCIES

Another type of prosocial behavior, often relevant on a smaller scale
than cooperation in the provision of public goods, is helping. This section discusses helping behavior in two contexts. First, it discusses how
ordinary helping behavior resembles the cooperative behavior discussed
in Part I and illustrates how legal structures can be designed to take advantage of this behavior through the example of the borrowing groups
created by Grameen Bank. Second, it examines how and why an increase in group size can inhibit helping behavior in an emergency and
applies the results to the design of corporate boards.
A.

Group Membership, Helping, and Cooperation

Helping behavior on a small scale mirrors the large-scale cooperative behavior discussed in Part I. People are more likely to direct helping
behavior of various sorts towards people who are members of their social

group rather than helping strangers to the group. 75 Put another way,
most acts of help are made for the benefit of someone known to the
helper. 76 By definition, these groups are relatively small and tend to be
homogeneous because people, left to their own devices, tend to interact
with people like themselves. 77 The mechanisms of cooperation are also
similar to the large-scale context. Helping behavior correlates to the
amount of help received from other members of the group, illustrating
"the operation of network reciprocity. '7 8 Interactions characterized by
anonymity "increase[ ] the incidence of free riding," while communica79
tion between group members promotes cooperation.
In the microlending context, where small, unsecured loans are made
to very poor people to give them the capital to start income-producing
businesses, the Nobel Peace Prize-winning Grameen Bank takes advantage of the impact of group size and heterogeneity in designing its credit
75 Louis A. Penner et al., Prosocial Behavior: Multilevel Perspectives, 56 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 365, 369 (2005).
76 Amato, supra note 8, at 33-34.
77 Miller McPherson et al., Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks, 27 ANN.
Rav. Soc. 415 (2001).

78 Id.at 40.
79 Penner, supra note 75, at 381.
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structure. As the Bank explains on its website, "Borrowers are organized
into small, homogeneous groups. Such characteristics facilitate group
solidarity as well as participatory interaction. Organizing the primary
groups of five members and federating them into centres has been the
80
foundation of Grameen Bank's system."
The microcredit context is a good example of how legal structures
designed to encourage prosocial behavior can be created privately. The
bank's lending groups are initially created by the borrowers themselves,
and the requirement of homogeneity is imposed by a private entity. The
importance of mutual trust and support is particularly important in this
context, and it is understandable why the groups are homogeneous. This
scenario, however, highlights the potential for policies encouraging
prosocial behavior to conflict with policies that encourage social diversity. Imagine the reaction, legal and otherwise, if a bank in the United
States required borrowers to form ethnically homogeneous groups as a
condition of receiving a loan.
B.

Responding to Emergencies

Contemporary research on helping behavior in emergencies has its
genesis in the public outcry that arose in the aftermath of the murder of
Kitty Genovese in 1964.81 A few weeks after Genovese was killed near
her home in Kew Gardens, Queens, the New York Times reported that
thirty-eight people heard the attack but failed to call the police. 82 The
public reaction to the perceived apathy of the witnesses spurred social
psychologists to conduct experiments on helping behavior in
emergencies.
In a classic paper inspired by the Genovese murder, John M. Darley
and Bibb Latan6 reported on the results of an experiment in which people
expecting to take part in a discussion group by intercom were confronted
with the sounds of a person appearing to have a seizure.8 3 The study
reported that an increase in the size of the group witnessing an emergency inhibited helping behavior, measured in this case by the time taken
to report the victim's epileptic fit. 84 The study showed that the negative
impact on helping behavior was so strong that the increase in group size
reduced not only the likelihood that a given individual would act, but
also reduced the likelihood that any member of the group would act. As
a result, a "victim [wa]s considerably more likely to have gotten help
80
81
82
83
84

Grameen Bank, supra note 14.
See Gansberg, supra note 15, at 1.

Id.
Darley & Latan6, supra note 15.
Id. at 379-80.
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from one or two observers than from five during the first minute of the
85

fit."

As David Hyman observed, the negative impact of group size is
most likely to be a problem in ambiguous circumstances. 8 6 Subsequent
research reinforcing the Darley and Latan6 findings on the inhibiting effect of increases in group size on helping behavior highlights the role of
ambiguity in this context. In a meta-study reviewing subsequent work on
the issue, Latan6 and Steve Nida listed three psychological processes that
together account for this effect. 87 First, "audience inhibition" is caused
by a fear of embarrassment resulting from acting incorrectly.8 8 When
more people are present, the risk of embarrassment is greater, making the
inhibition stronger.8 9 Second, "social influence" occurs when a person
looks to other people in the group for cues on how to address an ambiguous situation. 90 In the emergency context, each member of the group
may see the others' inactivity and "interpret the situation as less critical
than it actually is or decide that inaction is the expected pattern of behavior." 91 Third, "diffusion of responsibility" is caused by the reduction of
the psychological cost of non-intervention that results when others are
present. 92 "The knowledge that others are present and available to respond, even if the individual cannot see or be seen by them, allows the
'93
shifting of some of the responsibility for helping to them.
The group dynamics that inhibit response to emergencies resemble
the group dynamics of a corporate board of directors and other oversight
groups facing possible wrongdoing. In this context, all three of the factors that inhibit responses to emergencies are present. Audience inhibition is particularly strong in the corporate board context because an
incorrect accusation of wrongdoing could be not only embarrassing, but
also permanently damaging to the director's reputation and career. Social influence is also relevant in this context because each director would
tend to take the inaction of others as a signal that there is nothing to be
concerned about. Similarly, diffusion of responsibility is relevant because the consequences of inaction are spread over the whole board. To
address this problem, it would make sense to both limit overall board
size and clearly assign responsibility for uncovering wrongdoing to an
85 Id. at 380.
86 David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspectiveon the Duty to Rescue, 84 TEx. L. REV. 653, 699-700 (2006).
87 See Bibb Latand & Steve Nida, Ten Years of Research on Group Size and Helping, 89
PSYCHOL. BULL. 308 (1981).
88 Id. at 309.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.

2008]

GROUP SIZE, HETEROGENEITY, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR

221

audit committee, or another small subset of the board. 94 Although the
assignment of responsibility to a small group might absolve the other
members of the board, the research on emergency helping shows that the
overall likelihood of action increases when responsibility is placed on the
fewest number of people.
CONCLUSION

In an increasingly diverse and complex society, the negative impacts of group size and heterogeneity on prosocial behavior will have a
tremendous impact on legal and policy issues. This essay sketches ways
in which legal structures can be used to mitigate those negative effects,
as well as preserve and promote the positive benefits of diversity. The
easy solution of organizing people into small, homogeneous groups may
work in some contexts, as shown by forestry management in Nepal and
Grameen Bank's borrowing groups. This easy solution, however, is
often unwarranted, impossible, or normatively undesirable. Designers of
legal structures should therefore take steps to mitigate the ways in which
group size and heterogeneity interfere with cooperative behavior. In
large-scale contexts, mitigation can be achieved by using dispute resolution mechanisms to enforce informal norms, or by replacing those informal norms with formal ones. Similar mitigation efforts can be made in
small-scale contexts that are analogous to emergency helping by placing
the responsibility for acting on a small and clearly defined group. In any
of these scenarios, designers of legal structures can take positive steps to
facilitate cooperation in a diverse society.

94 Limiting board size would be consistent with empirical research that has shown that
board size is inversely proportional to overall corporate performance. See, e.g., Pablo de Andres et al., CorporateBoards in OECD Countries: Size, Composition, Functioning,and Effectiveness, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE 197 (2005); Panagiotis K. Staikouras et al., The Effect of
Board Size and Composition on European Bank Performance,23 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 1 (2007).

